Brooks on "The Jeremy Lin Problem"

David Brooks has a thoughtful essay in today's New York Times about Jeremy Lin and religion. An excerpt:

For many religious teachers, humility is the primary virtue. You achieve loftiness of spirit by performing the most menial services. (That’s why shepherds are perpetually becoming kings in the Bible.) You achieve your identity through self-effacement. You achieve strength by acknowledging your weaknesses. You lead most boldly when you consider yourself an instrument of a larger cause.

The most perceptive athletes have always tried to wrestle with this conflict. Sports history is littered with odd quotations from people who try to reconcile their love of sport with their religious creed — and fail.

Jeremy Lin has wrestled with this tension quite openly. In a 2010 interview with the Web site Patheos, Lin recalled, “I wanted to do well for myself and my team. How can I possibly give that up and play selflessly for God?”

Lin says in that interview that he has learned not to obsess about stats and championships. He continues, “I’m not working hard and practicing day in and day out so that I can please other people. My audience is God. ... The right way to play is not for others and not for myself, but for God. I still don’t fully understand what that means; I struggle with these things every game, every day. I’m still learning to be selfless and submit myself to God and give up my game to Him.”

The odds are that Lin will never figure it out because the two moral universes are not reconcilable. Our best teacher on these matters is Joseph Soloveitchik, the great Jewish theologian. In his essays “The Lonely Man of Faith” and “Majesty and Humility” he argues that people have two natures. First, there is “Adam the First,” the part of us that creates, discovers, competes and is involved in building the world. Then, there is “Adam the Second,” the spiritual individual who is awed and humbled by the universe as a spectator and a worshipper.

I would love to hear reactions to Brooks's discussion of the "Jeremy Lin Problem."

Trash-talking, Racism & Football

Recent incidents (Luis Suarez/Patrice Evra and John Terry/Anton Ferdinand) have elevated awareness of racial abuse in English Premier League football.

Luis Suarez, a player for Liverpool FC, was banned for eight matches by the Football Association and was required to pay a £40,000 after racially abusing Patrice Evra of Manchester United in October. The rivalry between the teams has often caused great controversy with verbal abuse often directed between opposing fans and players. Suarez’s refusal to apologies to Evra, and Liverpool’s support for the player has provoked widespread criticism, as well as a wider debate about racism in football. In another case, England and Chelsea captain, John Terry, has been charged with a racially aggravated public order offence after he allegedly used racist language towards QPR defender Anton Ferdinand. He will appear in court on July 9th 2012. The fallout from this case led to the resignation of England’s manager, Fabio Capello.

While these cases firmly put racism in sport in the spotlight, it is important to acknowledge that the root source of such on-field incidents stem from a widespread acceptance of sledging/trash-talking in sport. The notion of sledging/trashtalking is an issue that causes much controversy. In cricket it is thought to be the fielding team's way of getting inside the batsman's mind (Booth, 2007). In football, taunting and abusing opponents appears to be the norm for both spectators and players.

In the philosophical literature, apologists have suggested it is simply (a strategic) part of the game (Cox et al., 2003; Summers, 2007) while critics consider it a form of borderline cheating (gamesmanship) (Howe, 2004) or irrelevant to sporting competition (Dixon, 2008).


Questions
Is it possible to segregate sledging into two distinct categories – impersonal (non-moral) and personal (moral)?

Impersonal (non-moral) sledging/trash-talk is the attempt to add psychological pressure to an opponent (Fraser, 2005) by directing disparaging remarks about their sporting performance. As such critical comments do not directly disrespect an individual’s personhood and integrity, but is instead an attack on what they do rather than who they are.

As such comments are relatively benign are they morally insignificant?
Should we then focus more on more overt and personal verbal abuse?
Or is it fruitless to forge a normative line between what is personal and impersonal as both forms involve viewing ones opponents as means rather than ends in themselves?
Does such behaviour degenerate into personal attacks, such as racial or other offensive insults?

Philosophy of Linsanity

I've been thinking a lot about Jeremy Lin lately--and about the social phenomenon of "Linsanity." I wonder what philosophers have to add that will complement the discussion in the popular press.

Is it the underdog story that is so compelling? i.e., Lin as Linderella?

Is Lin's ethnicity a compelling part of the story? Tim Dalrymple argues that it is, but that Lin's religious beliefs are even more significant.

Is there anyone else here who is fascinated by Jeremy Lin and Linsanity, and why?

Distinguishing the individual and the athlete: cheerleading, sexual assault and drink-driving

A recent news story highlights the case of a 16 year old cheerleader who refused to chant the name of a player who had previously sexually assaulted her, and was subsequently expelled from the squad for doing so. After attempting to bring a compensatory claim against her school which failed, she was ordered to pay $45,000 in costs.

The court ruled:

"As a cheerleader, HS served as a mouthpiece through which [the school district] could disseminate speech – namely, support for its athletic teams. This act constituted substantial interference with the work of the school because, as a cheerleader, HS was at the basketball game for the purpose of cheering, a position she undertook voluntarily."

I'm not sure of the credibility of this story as I have no background knowledge on it but one of the most interesting aspects is the distinction between the role and responsibilities of being an athlete (if one can call cheerleading a sport) and the rights one has as a free individual.

On a similar note, Danny Care has been dropped from the England rugby team for being found guilty of drink-driving after a New Year's party. This again highlights the ambiguous distinction between a private and public life and the rights and responsibilities that come with each. Care was not on duty with the England team at the time and the matter was rightly dealt with by the police and law courts. However, the act was seen to be justification for his dismissal from national selection.

These stories provide us with a couple of interesting philosophical questions:

To what extent is one a free individual in sport?

What bearing should decisions made in one's private life have on one's public sporting life?

In Defense of Philosophy of Sport

 

Some are skeptical that sport is worthy of the attention of philosophers. They may reject philosophy of sport because sport is an element of so-called “low” culture rather than high culture.[1] Others may be concerned about the violence, anti-intellectualism, fascistoid hero worship, and morally problematic tribalism that can be found in sporting contexts. And perhaps others simply find sport uninteresting as a context for doing philosophy.

 However, there are many reasons why sport merits the attention of philosophers.

First, many of the foregoing reasons for rejecting philosophy of sport are examples of the type of reflection upon sport done by people working in the field. Philosophers of sport engage the morally and socially troubling aspects of this realm of human life. Given the centrality of sport across numerous cultures, philosophers can provide a useful and important corrective to the excesses of sport and sporting culture. Fortunately, however, there are more hopeful reasons for engaging in philosophy of sport related to its more positive aspects, including the numerous connections that exist between morality and sport. I'll have more to say on this in a future post.

Second, philosophical work done in the context of sport is relevant to other areas of philosophy. It can illuminate issues in metaethics, normative ethical theory, philosophy of law, biomedical ethics, and issues related to race, gender, and social justice.[2]

Finally, moral philosophers should not only be concerned with a conceptual analysis of morality, seeking to understand the sources of our obligations, and elucidating a sound normative ethical theory. They should, in the tradition of Aristotle, also be concerned with becoming virtuous. Philosophical reflection upon sport and a philosophical approach to it can help us understand and engage in the process of moral development via the cultivation of virtue in our sporting lives which we may then transfer to the rest of our lives.

For those readers who are able to attend, this year's London Lectures at the Royal Institute of Philosophy all deal with philosophy of sport. And for those unable to attend, at some point videos will be made available at the website of the Institute.

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[1] For a sustained argument against this view, see William J. Morgan, Why Sports Morally Matter (London: Routledge, 2006).

[2] For example, see Jan Boxill (ed.), Sports Ethics: An Anthology Anthology (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003; William Morgan, Ethics in Sport, 2d. ed. (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 2007).